Cognitive systems are wilder than today's dynamical systems theory can handle. While cognitive systems might be tamed in principle, it seems that the very notion of a dynamical system will change in the process.
they are mathematically explained as resulting from universal laws concerning attractors, bifurcations, and chaos-related phenomena (as in the HKB model reported by van Gelder).
The systems thus studied are typically anatomical or functional subsystems of complete agents.
When complete agents are investigated (e.g. Beer 1995b: walking insects; Smithers 1995: maneuvering robots), only a minute fraction of their behavioral repertoire is ever assessed.
Arguably, complete cognitive systems have the following properties: (i) they are driven by stochastic input which varies on the system's own characteristic timescales, (ii) they are highdimensional, with many variables developing according to different laws in different subsystems, (iii) and they are non-stationary. Non-stationarity is here understood as resulting from a non-parametric change in the dynamical law itself, as occasioned e.g. by topological restructuring of neural connectivity, by evolutionary processes, or by growth.
I will call systems having properties (i)-(iii), wild systems.
Wild systems cannot be caught by today's mathematicians. Even basic concepts like attractors or bifurcations cease to be of much help in systems driven by fast, stochastic input. Highdimensional systems currently can only be approached with respect to some kind of collective parameters , like in synergetic systems or mean-field approaches. Finally, with non-stationarity of the hard kind meant in (iii) we are simply lost.
In my view, cognition can only be rightfully understood as a property of complete, situated agents. This is also the view of the interdisciplinary strand of research variously referred to as, e.g., "situated action", "behavior-based robotics", or "new AI" (Pfeifer & Scheier 1998) .
Therefore, given the premises:
• cognition is irreducibly a property of complete, situated agents,
• complete, situated agents are wild systems,
• current dynamical systems theory cannot catch wild systems, it follows that
• current dynamical systems theory cannot catch cognitive systems.
One remedy is to bring in CH again, and pursue "hybrid" models of cognition. Examples abound, especially in mobile robotics. While most of these hybrid architectures amout to an addition of dynamical and computational-symbolical modules, some aim at a true marriage of
